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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this study is to examine empirically the variables of the risks of Islamic 
banks in the Gulf countries. Methodologically, we use a sample of 23 Islamic banks 
during the period from 2007 to 2012. From the empirical findings, we can show that 
the variablevolatility of return on assetsand the regulatory variable explains the 
banking risks. Nous avons aussi montré que la taille influence les risques 
bancaires.We have alsoshownthat size influences bankingrisks. In addition, we find 
that the sizeinfluences banking risks.It has allowed us to see that the big banks can 
invest in more risky projects. 
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1. Introduction 
Islamic finance is still recent compared to his counterpart conventional. It is based on 
financial instruments specific to its specific nature. Islamic banks are also exposed to financial 
risks. These risks are multiple and multidimensional. They affect the performance of the 
banking system. In fact, the definition of risk is a classic approach but important since it 
constitutes the point of departure of their management. Therisk in a banking sector is 
generally a result of movements of deregulation, regulation and the competition. Where, 
financial institutions must increase their monitoring in the management of risks and comply 
with the standards of prudential regulation. 
The concept of risks is probably one of the subjects that arouse the most research in the field 
of mathematical finance. So in this paper, we try to answer at the question related to the risks 
in Islamic banks. In addition, the study of the risks in Islamic banks is one of the main 
objectives in the recent financial literature. In our paper, we investigate empirically for 
thedeterminants of the risk in Islamic banks. To do, we employ a sample composed by 23 
Islamic banks during the period of study from 2007 to 2012. We employ a regression by 
Ordinary Least Square.  
Furthermore, the observation of the empirical results allowed us to remark that the variable 
volatility of return on assets (SD ROA) and the regulatory variable explains the banking risks. 
We have also shown that size influences banking risks. In addition, we find that the size 
influences banking risks.  
The rest of our paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the literature review 
relative to the risks in banks.Section 3 describes the data used in this study. Section 4 
describes the econometric methodology. Section 5 discusses the main empirical results. 
Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Literature review 
 
Islamic finance is a new branch of finance.Studies that are interested in Islamic 
finance are now multiple and diverse.But most of this work was in the form of a 
comparative study between Islamic banks and conventional banks. 
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The practice of Islamic finance also differs from one country to another.In this sense 
K. Brown
3
,(2003), has done a job where he compares Islamic banks in different 
countries. 
Iqbal M., (2001)
4
Published an article that focuses on a period from 1990 to 1998. He 
found that Islamic banks have worked well during this period and have resisted 
problems well. 
The literature devoted to the study of risks in Islamic banks is scarce.In 2001, Khan 
and T. Ahmed H
5
,Carried out a study in the form of a questionnaire addressed to the 
different Islamic banks in different countries.The authors found that the most 
important risk for the sample of banks studied is the risk of margin followed by 
operational risk. 
In addition, credit risk plays an important role and is considered one of the most 
important risks.This risk is related to non-payment of consideration.It can be at the 
root of other risks, namely liquidity risk.Other research by Iqbal et al (2007) in his 
book "An introduction to Islamic finance"6Have shown that the biggest risk in 
lending banks is credit. 
Furthermore, Van H. and Z. Iqbal asserts in its "Risk analysis for Islamic banks' 
book that the credit risk is the main cause of failure of banks
7
.They also added that it 
is important to carefully analyze the risks.This analysis enriches the risk 
management debate. 
In the same context Romzie R., (2008), showed that there is "a positive relationship 
between risk management and the risk management process.This process consists of 
two steps the first is to identify the variables that is to say, identify sources of risk, 
while the second is to develop methods to quantify risk using mathematical models 
". 
3. The data 
The purpose of this paper is to examine empirically the variable of risks in Islamic banks. We 
employ a sample of 23 Islamic banks in the gulf countries during the period of study from 
2007 to 2012. 
Financial data and accounts are extracted from the site of the Islamic Development Bank and 
Financial publications and annual reports of Islamic banks. 
4. The model 
                                                 
 
 
 
Iqbal,Z et Mirakhor. A., (2007) « An introduction to islamic finance », John Wiley et Sons (Asia) Pte Ltd 
7
Hennie VAN Greuning and Zamir Iqbal (2008)« Risk analysis for Islamic banks » 
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In this paper, we will refer to the model, in which we studied the variable of risks in Islamic 
banks. 
We use threemodels: 
Z-score i, t =β0 +β1 REG i, t +β2 SIZE i, t +β3 LIQUI i, t +β4 LLOSS i, t +β5 AGEI, t 
+μi, t 
σROA i, t =β0 +β1 REG i, t +β2TAILLE i, t +β3 LIQUI i, t +β4 LLOSS i, t +β5 AGEI, t 
+μi, t 
σROEi, t =β0 +β1 REG i, t +β2 SIZE i, t +β3 LIQUI i, t +β4 LLOSS i, t +β5 AGEI, t +μi, 
t 
where : 
Risk measurement is based on three variables: Z-score, volatility of return on equity and 
volatility of return on assets.  
The Z-score is equal to the return on assets plus the own fund ratio divided by the standard 
deviation of the return on the asset. 
The volatility of return on equity is the standard deviation of return on equity.This variable 
has been applied in several studies.Return on equity is calculated as: net profit / equity. 
The third variable used to measure risk is the volatility of asset returns.It is measured by the 
standard deviation of return on assets, where the return on assets is the ratio of net profits to 
total assets. 
The variables relating to banking risks are: 
Bank regulation:the regulatory capital is set by the Basel Committeeto support the soundness 
and stability of banks.It contains solvency ratiosused internationally. 
These ratios must be met by all financial institutions.The ratio ofRegulation is a relationship 
between equity and total assets.It imposes on the bank to have a minimum amount of own 
funds that must be greater than 8%. 
The size of the bank:This variable is measured by the natural logarithm of totalAssets.This 
variable may have an influence on the risk incurred by the bank.ABank with a fairly 
diversified portfolio, it can easily accesscapital market.Size allows the bank to engage in 
riskier activitiesthan those of small sizes. 
LLOSS:It represents the value of provision for loss divided by the bank's total 
assets.Provisions are the funds the bank keeps to cover its losses.Generally the more the 
provisions are important the greater the level of risk of the bank. 
The liquidity ratio:This ratio is obtained by dividing the liquid assets to liquid liabilities.It 
determines the ability of the bank to meet its short-term commitments.That is, assess the 
bank's ability to pay its debts in the short term.This ratio must be greater than 100% so that 
there is more security in the regulations of the debts. 
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The age of the bank:his variable also influences the risk of bank insolvency.The older the 
bank, the broader its experience, the more it would have the skills to select more profitable 
projects. 
In our study, we used the value 1 to designate banks that are less than or equal to 20 years of 
age.The value of 2 is given to banks that have an age between 20 and 30 years.The value of 3 
is used when banks are older than 30 years. 
 
5. Empirical results 
 
In this section, we specify the type of estimate for models which is a regression on panel data. 
The choice of this type of regression is justified by the presence of the two dimensions in the 
data used, the first dimension is time (a period of 6 years) and the second is individual (the 
sample used is composed of 23 Islamic banks). 
 
The estimation is done by the SPSS software, using the "INPUT" method, which forces all the 
explanatory variables to enter the model whatever the results of the tests of bad model 
specifications. 
 
The descriptive statistics for the first regression show that the Z-score is on average 0.8673 
with volatility equal to 0.7417. 
The independent variables injected into the regression show that capital regulation is on 
average 145.3192, which is higher than the minimum required by the government (8%).We 
can conclude that the banks considered in this study comply with the recommendations of the 
Basel Committee. 
The ratio of liquidity deployed has an average value of 235.023 which is greater than 100% 
with a maximum value of 33805.4 and a minimum value equal to 0.003. 
The size of the bank in averages is 20.4932, which allows us to conclude that the banks are 
mostly small. 
Finally, the reserve ratio is on average 0.03607, which suggests a small amount of bad debts. 
According to the statistics of the age variable, the average age of banks considered is between 
10 and 30 years, with an average of 1.46, that is to say an average age of 15 years. 
The SD ROE has an average of 0.185.Indeed, this variable is more volatile than the "SD 
ROA" because the Islamic banking industry has a low or negative ROE. 
These losses are due to unfavourable economic conditions and lower market prices.Now 
Islamic products are backed by real assets (ABS)
8
in addition to the absence of effective risk 
management tools.The "SD ROE" varies between 0.0625 and 0.451. 
                                                 
8
Assets-backedsecurities 
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In continuation of the analysis of the results, we conduct a test of correlation between the 
variables used. Table 1 presents the empirical results of correlation test. Furthermore, the 
empirical findings show that the majority of Pearson correlation coefficients do not exceed the 
tolerance limit (0.7), which does not cause problems in estimating the two models of the two 
models.  
The table of the matrix correlation shows that the variables "liqui" and "Coarse" are 
perfectly and positively correlated.In addition, according to Cohen tags
9
(1988), the variable 
"LLOSS" is strongly and positively correlated with the variables "Liqui" and 
"Coarse".This said that we will have problems of multi-collinearity in the regressions that 
we will perform.Indeed, the variable "LLOSS" is approximated by the ratio reserves / total 
assets due to the lack of data on the total amount of credit. 
There is also a positive correlation between regulation and default risk for Islamic banks that 
follow logic of sharing profits and risks.By seeking an adequate security cushion, bank 
executives are relaxing efforts to select and monitor projects.They then choose more risky 
projects and provide less effort in their supervision. 
- Test for poor model specification 
* Normality (Jarque-Bera) 
The normality test (Jarque-Bera) conventionally refers to the calculation of symmetry 
coefficient (skewness) and kurtosis (kurtosis).Indeed, if these coefficients differ respectively 
from zero and three then the process generating a series of returns follows a non-normal 
distribution.Otherwise, the normal distribution is completely characterized by the expectation 
and variance
10
. 
The table of the test of Jarque-Berashows that for the dependent variable and a Z-score SD 
ROE, all independent variables except age, have a kurtosis "kurtosis" high and much 
higher than 3.It informs us of the high probability of achieving extreme values.The 
symmetry factor, it is strictly different from 0 for all variables examined.This coefficient 
varies between -4.424 for the variable "size" and 12 for the variables "Liqui" and 
"Coarse" and with a negative bias for the dependent variable.Concerning the dependent 
variable SD ROA, all the independent variables, except LLOSS, show a flattening 
coefficient of less than 3, the distribution is asymmetric on the left 
                                                 
9If the correlation is around 0.1, it is a small effect, which means a weak correlation. If the correlation 
is around 0.3, it is a medium-sized effect, which means an average correlation. If the correlation is 
around 0.5, it is a large size effect which means a strong correlation 
 
10
If the Skeweness is 0 and kurtosis gets 3: The distribution is called normal. If the skewness and 
kurtosis are respectively less than 0 and 3; the distribution is called asymmetrical left and 
platikurtique. Otherwise, the distribution is said asymmetrical right and leptokurtic. 
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(platikurticdistribution).The coefficient symmetry is different from 0 for all variables.This 
coefficient varies between 0.086 for the variable "size" and 7092 for "LLOSS" variable. 
We can then conclude that the distribution is biased in both directions (negative and 
positive).In light of these figures, the hypothesis of symmetry is rejected in this investigation. 
For the regression of Z-score, Distributive Durbin Watson displays a value of 1.653 which is 
close to 2.That said, a priori, there is a lack of autocorrelation of errors.However, the graph 
shows that to the left of the normal distribution lies residual autocorrelations.Therefore, it is 
necessary to refer to the statistical table for a firm and precise interpretation. 
According to the statistical table for the 1
st
regression, the Durbin Watson statistic is less than 
the lower limit of1= 1.66.Residuewe reject the hypothesis H0autocorrelation of absence and in 
accordance with graph that shows the existence of autocorrelation left of the normal 
distribution of residuals. 
For the second regression, the Durbin Watson statistic has a value of 1.973 which is greater 
than the upper terminal d2 = 1.8.We do not reject H0Of non-autocorrelation of residues, 
although the graph indicates that there are correlations to the right of the normal distribution 
of residues.For the third regression, the Durbin Watson has a value of 2.2 which is equal to 
the upper bound 4-d2 = 2.2.Residuewe reject the hypothesis H0of no autocorrelation in 
accordance with graphic indicating the existence of autocorrelation to the right of the normal 
distribution of residuals. 
Autocorrelation of the residuals of the variables Z-score, SDROA, SDROE 
-Multi-collinearity test - Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) 
The independent variable "Coarse" is excluded from the regression seen the collinearity 
problem remains.In other words, according to hypothesis 1 of the multiple regression, the 
explanatory variables are linearly related. 
Economically, these variables that present near-exact linear relations generally satisfy an 
accounting identity.When the variables are linearly related, the X matrix is of a lower rank to 
the number of variables.Therefore, the X'X matrix is not invertible (singular). 
Klein testingmark only the bivariate collinearity.To estimate the multicollinearity, one should 
perform the regression of each exogenous variable Xj with the other exogenous (p-1), and 
then examine the coefficient of determinationAssociated.They baptized the variance inflation 
factor (VIF) the quantity (Saporta, page 422). 
We speak of an inflation factor because we have the following relation: 
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The standard deviation of the estimate is multiplied by a factor . 
The table of collinearity statistics shows the variables "Liqui" and "LLOSS" the values of 
the partial correlations and party down below the zero order correlation (simple).This means 
that SDROE and the Z-score, within Islamic banks, are explained by other variables.As for 
the second regression, the independent variables contribute to explain the SDROA within the 
Islamic banks to the countries of the Golf. 
The tolerances of the variable "Liqui" and "LLOSS" are near 0, there is a multicollinearity 
manifest and the standard deviation of the regression coefficients will be inflated.A variance 
inflation factor (VIF) is generally considered to be greater than 2. 
In our case, for the two variables already mentioned, the FIV is well above 2, namely 39,487 
and 39,455 respectively in the first and third regression.This suggests the existence of a multi-
collinearity problem.By cons, in the second regression, the tolerances of all dependent 
variables are well above zero, with lower VIF the critical value 2. 
In this paper, we examine the relationship between independent variables and banking risk, 
taking into account the age of the banks.We can use the OLS method (ordinary least 
squares). 
For a model to be of quality the improvement obtained with the independent variables must 
be large and the residuals between the observed values and the regression line must be 
small.To examine this, we use the SPSS tests of the F value. 
In our case, the value of F is 30,705 and is significant at p <0.0005.This means that the 
probabilities of obtaining an F-value of this size by chance are less than 0.05%.Independent 
variables explain, on average, the variability of the dependent variable.However, for the first 
and third regression, we find that the variability ofDependent variable explained by the 
regression is very low and the respective F values are not significant at the 5% 
threshold.When the model provides a significant improvement, it should be reported to what 
extent the data are adjusted to this model.In a way, it is possible to measure in what weighting 
the model represents the dispersion of points in the graph. 
This information exists in the table above with the index "R" which represents the value of 
the multiple correlation of the model.It represents the combined correlation of all 
independent variables of a model with the dependent variable.The R
2
valueindicates the 
percentage of variability of the dependent variable explained by the regression model.We can 
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therefore say that the volatility of the return on assets can explain nearly 53% of the risks in 
the Islamic banks.Note that it is extremely rare to find such a high coefficient.The value of R 
adjusted by the number of degrees of freedom is an estimate of the robustness of this model if 
we take a different sample from the same population. 
Only the second regression SDROA has anadjustedR
2
tolerable 52%.In other words, the 
model helps explain Islamic banks' risk-taking.The result of the first regression (dependent 
variable Z score), shows that the model provides a poor goodness of fit (R 
2
 = 5%).Therefore, 
we cannot push the analysis any more since the regression is not globally significant. 
Given the results of the second regression (dependent variable SD ROA), we can conclude 
that the regulatory variable is statistically and economically significant at the 1% 
threshold.In fact, this variable has a relatively small coefficient. 
The model provides a coefficient of determination R
2
(adjusted by 52%) relatively high 
compared to the other two regressions.Therefore, we can conclude that this regression 
contributes better to explain the risk of Islamic banks. 
According to the results of the third regression (dependent variable SD ROE), we find that 
the model is not statistically significant (adjusted R
2
equal to -0.8%).Moreover, all the 
estimated coefficients are not significant. 
Finally, the age variable, although not related to the risk of insolvency, we can conclude that 
the seniority of the banks does not have an impact on the volatility of return on equity and the 
volatility of profitability Economic and the Z-score. 
To determine the relative importance of the significance of the independent variables, we 
need to consider the standardized coefficients.The "Coarse" helps the model better because 
it has a higher coefficient absolute standard that the variable "Size", which is still significant. 
6- Conclusion  
An attempt was made to assess the risks of Islamic banks in the Golf region.We have 
therefore studied the behaviour of 23 Islamic banks spread over 5 Golf countries duringthe 
period 2004-2009.The statistical analysis has shown that Islamic banks are sensitive to the 
level of capitalization and size. 
First, the capital ratio is, on average, statistically and economically significant for Islamic 
banks in the Golf region.Then we see that an increase in the capital ratio leads to an increased 
risk of the Islamic banks studied but rather contributes to increase it. 
"The positive relationship between regulation and risk is explained by a greater risk-taking 
than the hedging effect of an increase in capital.If the increase in regulation increases the 
return on assets, it has a negative effect on performance (risk-adjusted returns).Because of 
their presence in the financial markets, these banks are subject to greater market pressure ". 
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The Basel Capital Regulatory Agreements seek to promote market discipline.They require 
banks to disclose market information in order to get an idea of their state of health. 
Our sample refers to banks with different sizes.In fact, we note that the size effect positively 
influences the risk taking of these banks.That said, larger banks, which benefit from a large 
security cushion, are at greater risk than smaller banks. 
On the one hand, this state of affairs is in conformity with the orthodoxy which stipulates that 
banks of size and size bear a higher risk.On the other hand, the paradigm of sharing profits 
and losses, on which Islamic banks are founded, represents a safety net for banks in terms of 
moral risk and anti-selection. 
However, we find that age, does not explain the risk run by Islamic banks.Indeed, although 
the age of the banks studied varies between 10 and 30 years, it is clear that this variable does 
not affect the risk since, on the one hand, most of these banks have changed activity only 
recently and On the other hand, the reputation and the originality of the Islamic banks ensue 
essentially from their conformity with the rules of the Sharia ' and not on the age of the bank. 
As for liquidity, we absolutely tolerate the neutrality of this variable vis-à-vis the risk. Unlike 
conventional banks, Islamic banks are established in connection with the prohibition of 
interest and usury. Therefore, Islamic banks are not subject to liquidity crises in the absence 
of the activity of the creation of the currency, although they are exposed to a potential 
liquidity risk triggered by insolvency such as case of " Mourabha" . 
The empirical part of this work was based on the exploitation of a model. The results show 
that the volatility of variable yield assets (ROA SD) is the one that explains more than other 
variables, the banking risks. The variable regulation has also had a significant impact on 
banking risks. We have also shown that the size influences the banking risks. It allowed us 
to see that the bank is larger more it can invest in riskier projects. 
After this study, some research approaches could be explored. In this sense, we can examine 
the effect of the composition of Sharia 'board on risk-taking in Islamic banks. In addition, we 
can test the influence of the capital structure of Islamic banks on the risk to them. 
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Apendix -A 
List of Banks 
 Country  banks Number of banks 
   
 ABC islamic Bank   
   
 Al Baraka Bank islamic  
   
 Arcapita Bank   
   
 Bahrainislamicbank  
   
 Capivest Bank   
   
bahrain Gulf Finance House   12  
 
Internetionalinvestmentbank 
  
   
 Investors Bank   
   
 Khaleej Commercial Bank   
   
 Kuwait Finance House Bahrain  
   
 Liquidity management center   
   
 Unicorninvestmentbank  
   
 Abu Dhabi islamicbank  
   
United ArabEmirates DubaiIslamic Bank   4  
 
EmiratesIslamic Bank  
  
   
 Sharjah Islamic Bank   
   
SaudiArabia Al rajhi Bank   2  
 
Bank Aljazira 
  
   
 First Finance Company  
   
Qatar  International Islamic  3  
   
 Qatar Islamic Bank   
   
kuwait Kuwait Finance House   2  
 
Gulf Investment House  
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The correlation matrix 
N = 138 
Regression SD ROA   SD ROA  Liqui Regl  LLOSS   CUT   AGE  
 Pearson SD ROA Correlation  1,000   , 148  , 717  , 113  -, 272 -, 330 
 Liqui  , 148   1,000  , 232  -, 028  -, 233  -, 
097  
 Regl , 717 , 232  
1,000  
 , 090  -, 513  -, 
445  
  
LLOSS  
 , 113   -, 028   , 090   1,000  -, 239  , 076  
  CUT  -, 272 -, 233 -, 513 -, 239  1,000  , 482 
  AGE  -, 330  -, 097  -, 445  , 076  , 482  
1,000  
Sig.  (Unilateral)   SD 
ROA  
 .   , 042   , 000   , 093   , 001   , 000  
 Liqui  , 042   .   , 003   , 372   , 003   , 129  
 Regl  , 000   , 003   .   , 146   , 000   , 000  
  
LLOSS  
 , 093   , 372   , 146   .   , 002   , 187  
  CUT   , 001   , 003   , 000   , 002   .   , 000  
  AGE   , 000   , 129   , 000   , 187   , 000   .  
 
The "SD ROA" marries a negative relationship with the variable "Size" and the variable 
"Age".A priori, that said, as the age of the bank and its size increases the risk is low. 
 
The correlation matrix 
N = 144 
Regression SD ROE   SD ROE  Liqui Regl  LLOSS   AGE   CUT  
 Correlation of Pearson SD ROE  1,000  -, 059  -, 
059 
 -, 050  , 117  -, 033 
 Liqui  -, 059  1,000  
1,000 
 , 987  -, 
054 
 , 024 
 Regl  -, 059  1,000  
1,000 
 , 987  -, 
054 
 , 024 
  LLOSS   -, 050  , 987  , 987  1,000  -, 
042 
 , 031 
  AGE   , 117  -, 054  -, 
054 
 -, 042  1,000  , 026 
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  CUT   -, 033  , 024  , 024  , 031  , 026  1,000 
Sig.  (Unilateral)   SD 
ROE  
 .  , 241  , 241  , 278  , 081  , 349 
 Liqui  , 241  .  , 000  , 000  , 259  , 388 
 Regl  , 241  , 000  
. 
 , 000  , 259  , 388 
  LLOSS   , 278  , 000  , 000  .  , 309  , 356 
  AGE   , 081  , 259  , 259  , 309  .  , 379 
  CUT   , 349  , 388  , 388  , 356  , 379  . 
 
The standard deviation of financial profitability is negatively correlated with the variables 
Liqui, LLOSS, Regl and Taille.Indeed, as the size of the bank increases as much the risk 
decreases.Similarly, banking regulations are a risk-reducing factor in Islamic banks. 
 
The correlation matrix 
N = 144 
Regression Z score   Z SCORE  Liqui Regl  LLOSS   CUT   AGE  
PearsonZ SCORE Correlation  1,000   , 183   , 183   , 149   , 029   , 022  
 Liqui  , 183   1,000  1,000 , 987  , 024   -, 054  
 Regl  , 183  1,000  1,000  , 987  , 024   -, 054  
  LLOSS   , 149  , 987 , 987  1,000   , 031   -, 042  
  CUT   , 029   , 024   , 024   , 031   1,000   , 026  
  AGE   , 022   -, 054   -, 054   -, 042   , 026   1,000  
Sig.  (Unilateral)   Z 
SCORE  
 .   , 014   , 014   , 366   , 366   , 398  
 Liqui  , 014   .   , 000   , 388   , 388   , 259  
 Regl  , 014   , 000   .   , 388   , 388   , 259  
  LLOSS   , 037   , 000   , 000   , 356   , 356   , 309  
  CUT   , 366   , 388   , 388   .   .   , 379  
  AGE   , 398   , 259   , 259   , 379   , 379   .  
 
Significant at the 5% threshold 
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Table1 : Test of Jarque-Bera 
 skewness
11
 kurtosis
12
 
     
 Statistical Stderror Statistical Stderror 
     
 Z-score   -1,613   , 202   5,046   , 401  
Liqui  12,000   , 202   144,000   , 401  
Regl  12,000   , 202   144,000   , 401  
 LLOSS   11,566   , 202   136,618   , 401  
 CUT   -4.424   , 202   24,995   , 401  
 AGE   1,227   , 202   , 079   , 401  
 
     
 SD ROA   1,716   , 206   2.012   , 410  
Liqui  1,091   , 206   , 937   , 410  
Regl  1,421   , 206   , 895   , 410  
 LLOSS   7,092   , 206   57,624   , 410  
 CUT   , 086   , 206   , 755   , 410  
 AGE   1,162   , 206   -, 082   , 410  
 N valid (listwise)      
     
 SD ROE   1,180   , 202   1,492   , 401  
Liqui  12,000   , 202   144,000   , 401  
Regl  11,566   , 202   136,618   , 401  
 LLOSS   12,000   , 202   144,000   , 401  
 CUT   -4.424   , 202   24,995   401  
 AGE   1.227   , 202   , 079   , 401  
 N valid (listwise)      
     
 
Table 2 : Statistics of collinearity 
 Variables   95% intervals of  Correlations  Statistics of  
Explanatory Confidence for B     Collinearity 
 Thickheaded Limit Correlation  Partial Part Tolerance VIF 
 Lower Top simple      
   Z-score     
         
 Constant   -, 083   1,468        
Liqui  , 000   , 001   , 183    , 233   , 230  , 025 39,487 
 LLOSS   -6,619   -, 765   , 149    -, 207   -, 203  , 025 39,455 
 CUT   -, 029   , 043   , 029    , 034   , 033   , 997   1,003  
 AGE   -, 121   , 218   , 022    , 048   , 046   , 991   1,009  
   SD ROA     
                                                 
11
Coefficients of symmetry 
12Coefficients of flattening 
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 Constant   -, 261   -, 014        
Liqui  -, 037   , 042   , 148    , 012   008  , 917 1,091 
Regl  , 157   , 229   , 717    , 677   , 626  , 671 1,491 
 LLOSS   -, 043   , 330   , 113    , 131   , 090  , 886 1,129 
 CUT   , 001   , 013   -, 272    , 205   , 142  , 586 1.707 
 AGE   -, 020   , 005   -, 330    -, 103   -, 070  , 675 1,481 
   SD ROE     
 Constant   , 090   , 278        
Liqui  , 000   , 000   -, 059    -, 056   -, 056  , 025 39,487 
 LLOSS   -, 252   , 457   -, 050    , 049   , 048  , 025 39,455 
 AGE   -, 007   , 034   , 117    , 112   , 111   , 991   1,009  
 CUT   -, 005   , 003   -, 033    -, 037   -, 036   997   1,003  
 
Table 3:ANOVA and Regression Summary 
Z-score  Sum  DDL  Average  F  Sig  R   R-two  R-two 
 squares   squares  Adjusted 
      
Regression  6,009   4   1,502   2,874   , 025   , 276   , 076   , 050  
Residue  72.668   139   , 523       
 Total   78,677   143        
 SD ROA  Sum Ddl Average  F  Sig  R   R-two  R-two 
 squares   squares  Adjusted 
      
Regression  , 291   5   , 058   30,705   , 000   , 733   , 538   , 520  
Residue  , 250   132   , 002       
 Total   , 541   137        
 SD ROE  Sum Ddl Average  F  Sig  R   R-two  R-two 
 squares   squares  Adjusted 
      
Regression  , 022   4   , 005   , 710   , 586   , 142   , 020   -, 008  
Residue  1.065   139   , 008       
 Total   1,086   143        
 
Table 4 :Results of coefficient estimates 
 Variables   Coefficients   Coefficients    
Regression Not standardized Standardized Explanatory   
  AT   Standard Error  Beta   T  Sig. 
  
  Constant   , 692   , 392    1,766   , 080  
 Liqui  , 000   , 000   1,445   2,821   , 005  
 Z SCORE   LLOSS   -3.692   1,480   -1,277   -2.494   , 014  
  CUT   , 007   , 018   , 033   , 401   , 689  
  AGE   , 048   , 086   , 046   , 561   , 576  
  Constant   -, 137   , 062    -2.205   , 029  
 Liqui  , 003   , 020   , 009   , 140   , 889  
 SD ROA  Regl , 193 , 018 , 764 10,571 , 000 
 LLOSS   , 143   , 094   , 096   1,520   , 131  
 
 CUT , 007 , 003 , 186 2,406 , 018 
  AGE   -, 008   , 006   -, 086   -1,189   , 236  
  (Constant)   , 184   , 047    3,878   , 000  
 Liqui  -1,084E-5   , 000   -, 350   -, 664   , 508  
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 SD ROE   LLOSS.   , 103   , 179   , 302   , 573   , 568  
  AGE   , 014   , 010   , 112   1,326   , 187  
  CUT   -, 001   , 002   -, 036   -, 433   , 665  
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